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ABSTRACT
Bitcoin is a top-ranked cryptocurrency that has experienced huge
growth and survived numerous aacks. e protocols making up
Bitcoin must therefore accommodate the growth of the network
and ensure security.
Security of the Bitcoin network depends on connectivity be-
tween the nodes. Higher connectivity yields beer security. In
this paper we make two observations: (1) current connectivity
in the Bitcoin network is too low for optimal security; (2) at the
same time, increasing connectivity will substantially increase the
bandwidth used by the transaction dissemination protocol, mak-
ing it prohibitively expensive to operate a Bitcoin node. Half of
the total bandwidth needed to operate a Bitcoin node is currently
used to just announce transactions. Unlike block relay, transaction
dissemination has received lile aention in prior work.
We propose a new transaction dissemination protocol, Erlay,
that not only reduces the bandwidth consumption by 40% assum-
ing current connectivity, but also keeps the bandwidth use almost
constant as the connectivity increases. In contrast, the existing
protocol increases the bandwidth consumption linearly with the
number of connections. By allowing more connections at a small
cost, Erlay improves the security of the Bitcoin network. And, as we
demonstrate, Erlay also hardens the network against aacks that
aempt to learn the origin node of a transaction. Erlay is currently
being investigated by the Bitcoin community for future use with
the Bitcoin protocol.
1 INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer (P2P) electronic cash system [44]. Recent
estimates indicate that there are over 60,000 nodes in the Bitcoin
network 1(as of March 2019). To keep up with the growth in the
number of nodes and usage of the network, the system must be
continually optimized while retaining the security guarantees that
its users have come to expect.
Security of the Bitcoin network depends on adequate network
connectivity. Bitcoin literature has repeatedly recommended in-
creasing the number of connections between nodes to make the
network more robust [7, 15]. As we explain in Section 3, certain
aacks become less successful if the network is highly connected.
Unfortunately, increasing the connectivity of the Bitcoin network
linearly increases the bandwidth consumption of transaction relay—
the protocol that currently takes up half of the total bandwidth
required to operate a Bitcoin node. Today, transaction relay alone
consumes as much as 18GB per node per month. If the connectivity
1hps://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/les/charts/soware.html
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Figure 1: Lifecycle of a Bitcoin transaction. In this paper
we optimize the protocols for relaying transactions between
nodes in the Bitcoin network (grey box).
were increased from the currently used eight outbound connections
to 24, the per-node bandwidth used for relaying transactions would
exceed 50GB/month. is would make it prohibitively expensive
for some users to operate a Bitcoin node. Despite this ineciency,
transaction relay has not received much aention in scientic liter-
ature, in contrast to block relay [2, 12, 48].
e overarching reason why the Bitcoin transaction relay proto-
col is inecient is that it relies on ooding. A Bitcoin transaction
corresponds to a transfer of funds between several accounts. Fig. 1
overviews the lifecycle of a transaction in the Bitcoin network. To
be accepted by the network of nodes, a transaction must be rst
disseminated, or relayed, throughout the network. en it must be
validated and included into a block with other valid transactions.
Finally, the block containing the transaction must be relayed to all
the nodes. Every Bitcoin transaction must reach almost all nodes in
the network, and prior work has demonstrated that full coverage
of the network is important for security [53].
Today, Bitcoin disseminates transactions by ensuring that every
message received by a node is transmied to all of its neighbors.
is ooding has high fault-tolerance since no single point of fail-
ure will halt relay, and it has low latency since nodes learn about
transactions as fast as possible [35].
However, ooding has poor bandwidth eciency: every node in
the network learns about the transaction multiple times. Our em-
pirical measurements demonstrate that transaction announcements
account for 30–50% of the overall Bitcoin trac. is ineciency
is an important scalability limitation: the ineciency increases as
the network becomes more connected, while connectivity of the
network is desirable to the growth and the security of the network.
Prior work has explored two principal approaches to address
this inecient use of bandwidth. e rst is the use of short trans-
action identiers (to decrease message size) [31]. e second is
to exclusively use blocks and never transmit individual transac-
tions [37]. Both approaches are inadequate: short identiers only
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Figure 2: Private and public nodes in the Bitcoin network.
reduce the constant factor and do not scale with the connectivity of
the network, while using only blocks creates spikes in block relay
and transaction validation. We discuss these approaches further in
Section 11.
e contribution of this paper is Erlay, a new protocol that we
designed to optimize Bitcoin’s transaction relay while maintaining
the existing security guarantees. e main idea behind our protocol
is to reduce the amount of information propagated via ooding
and instead use an ecient set reconciliation method [42] for most
of the transaction dissemination. In addition, we design the Erlay
protocol to withstand DoS, timing, and other aacks.
We implemented Erlay in a simulator and as part of the mainline
Bitcoin node soware, and evaluated Erlay at scale. Our results
show that Erlay makes announcement-related bandwidth negligible
while keeping latency a small fraction of the inter-block interval.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• We analyze bandwidth ineciency of Bitcoin’s transaction
relay protocol. We do this by running a node connected to
the Bitcoin network as well as by running a simulation of
the Bitcoin network. Our results demonstrate that 88% of
the bandwidth used to announce transactions (and around
44% of the overall bandwidth) is redundant.
• We propose a new, bandwidth-ecient, transaction relay
protocol for Bitcoin called Erlay, which is a combination
of fast low-fanout ooding and ecient set reconciliation,
designed to work under the assumptions of the Bitcoin
network.
• We demonstrate that the protocol achieves a close to opti-
mal combination of resource consumption and propagation
delay, and is robust to aacks. Erlay reduces the bandwidth
used to announce transactions by 84% immediately, and
allows the Bitcoin network to achieve higher connectivity
in the future for beer security.
Next, we review the background for our work.
2 BITCOIN BACKGROUND
For the purpose of connectivity graph and propagation analysis,
there are 2 types of nodes in the Bitcoin network: private nodes
that do not accept inbound connections and public nodes that
do accept inbound connections (see Fig. 2). Public nodes act as a
backbone of the network: they help new nodes bootstrap onto the
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Figure 3: Transaction exchange between two peers.
network. Once they have joined the network, public and private
nodes are indistinguishable in their operation: both node types per-
form transaction and block validation, and relay valid transactions
and blocks to their peers.
e current version of the Bitcoin transaction relay protocol
propagates messages among nodes using diusion [1], which is a
variation on random ooding. Flooding is a protocol where each
node announces every transaction it receives to each of its peers.
Announcements can be sent on either inbound and outbound links.
With diusion, a peer injects a random delay before announcing a
received transaction to its peers. is mitigates timing aacks [46]
and signicantly reduces the probability of in-ight collisions (when
two nodes simultaneously announce the same transaction over the
link between them).
e protocol by which a transaction propagates between two
peers is illustrated in Fig. 3. When a Bitcoin node receives a trans-
action (peer 1 in Fig. 3), it advertises the transaction to all of its
peers except for the node that sent the transaction in the rst place
and other nodes from which it already received an advertisement.
To advertise a transaction, a node sends a hash of the transaction
within an inventory, or INV message. If a node (peer 2 in Fig. 3)
hears about a transaction for the rst time, it will request the full
transaction by sending a GETDATA message to the node that sent
it the INV message.
We refer to the transaction-advertising portion of the protocol
(all the INV messages) as BTCFlood. Since it relies on ooding, most
transactions are advertised through each link in the network in one
direction (except those that are advertised during the block relay
phase). As a result, a node with n connections will send and receive
between n and 2n INV messages for a single transaction (two nodes
may announce the same transaction simultaneously to each other).
Both public and private nodes limit the number of inbound and
outbound connections (Fig. 2). By default a private node has no
inbound connections and up to 8 outbound connections, while a
public node can have 8 outbound connections as well as up to 125
inbound connections (but the inbound connection limit can be con-
gured up to around 1,000). us, as the number of private nodes
in the Bitcoin network grows, the bandwidth and computational
requirements to run a public node quickly increase. is is because
private nodes connect to multiple public nodes to ensure that they
are connected to the network through more than a single peer.
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As a result, Bitcoin designers have focused on (1) making the
running of a public node more accessible, in terms of required
bandwidth, computational power, and hardware resources, and (2)
making public nodes more ecient so that they can accept more
connections from private nodes. Our work targets both objectives.
3 THE PROBLEMWITH FLOODING
TRANSACTIONS
Flooding is inecient. BTCFlood sends many redundant trans-
action announcements. To see why, let us rst consider how many
announcements would be sent if the protocol were ecient. Since,
optimally, each node would receive each announcement exactly
once, the number of times each announcement is sent should be equal
to the number of nodes.
Next, let us consider how many times an announcement is sent
with BTCFlood. By denition, each node relays an announcement
on each of the links except the one where that announcement orig-
inally arrived. In other words, each link sees each announcement
once, if no two nodes ever send the same announcement to each
other simultaneously, and more than once if they do. erefore, in
BTCFlood each announcement is sent at least as many times as the
number of links.
If N is the number of nodes in the Bitcoin network, the num-
ber of links is 8N , because each node must make eight outbound
connections. erefore, the number of redundant announcements
is at least 8N − N = 7N . Each announcement takes 32 bytes out
of 300 total bytes needed to relay a single transaction to one node.
(ese 300 bytes include the announcement, the response and the
full transaction body). erefore, if at least seven out of eight an-
nouncements are redundant (corresponding to 224 bytes), at least
43% of all announcement trac is wasteful.
We validated this analysis experimentally. We congured a pub-
lic Bitcoin node with eight outbound connections and ran it for
one week. During this time, our node also received four inbound
connections. We measured the bandwidth dedicated to transac-
tion announcements and other transaction dissemination trac.
A received announcement was considered redundant if it corre-
sponded to an already known transaction. A sent announcement
was considered redundant if it was not followed by a transaction
request. According to our measurements (taken at multiple nodes
at dierent locations) 10% of the trac corresponding to received
announcements and 95% of the trac corresponding to the sent
announcements was redundant. Overall, 55% of all trac used by
our node was redundant.
Higher connectivity requiresmore bandwidth. Given that the
amount of redundant trac is proportional to the number of links,
increasing the connectivity of the network (the number of out-
bound links per node) linearly increases bandwidth consumption
in BTCFlood.
We modeled how the bandwidth consumption of disseminating
one transaction across the network of 60K nodes increases with
connectivity. Fig. 4 (whose results we conrmed via simulation)
shows that announcement trac turns dominant as the network
becomes more connected. With eight connections per node, a
private node may consume 9GB of bandwidth per month just for
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Figure 4: Analytical cost of relaying transactions via ood-
ing for one Bitcoin node during one month.
announcing transactions. Seing connectivity to 24 in Bitcoin today
would cause transaction relay to consume over 15GB/month.
Higher connectivity oers more security. In P2P networks,
higher connectivity improves network security. is was demon-
strated by both traditional P2P research [4, 5] and Bitcoin-specic
prior work [7, 15, 29, 36, 47].
Certain aacks become less successful if the network is highly
connected [28, 36, 46]. e eclipse aack paper [29] has shown that
fewer than 13 connections would be detrimental to the security
of the network. A recently discovered vulnerability [17] relies on
InvBlock [41]. InvBlock is a technique that prevents a transaction
from being propagated by rst announcing it to a node, but then
withholding the transaction contents for two minutes. With higher
connectivity, this aack is easier to mitigate.
4 PROTOCOL REQUIREMENTS
R1: Scale with the number of connections. Our main goal
is to design a transaction dissemination protocol that has good
scalability as a function of the number of connections. is way, we
can make the network more secure without sacricing performance.
R2: Maintain a network topology suited for a decentralized
environment. Bitcoin’s premise of a decentralized environment
puts constraints on the design of its network. Although imposing
a structure onto a network, e.g., by organizing it into a tree or
star topology, or by using DHT-style routing, enables bandwidth-
ecient implementation of ooding, this also introduces the risks
of censorship or partitioning [36]. e topology of the network
must, therefore, remain unstructured, and routing decisions must
be made independently by every node based on their local state.
R3: Maintain a reasonable latency. Transaction propagation
delays should remain in the ballpark of those experienced with the
existing protocol. Low latency is essential to user experience and
enables beer eciency in block relay [12].
R4: Be robust to attacks under the existing threatmodel. Our
protocol must remain robust under the same threat model as that
assumed by the existing protocol. Similarly to Bitcoin, we assume
that an aacker has control over a limited, non-majority, number
of nodes in the network, has a limited ability to make other nodes
connect to it, and is otherwise unrestricted in intercepting and
generating trac for peers that it is connected to.
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Figure 6: Comparison of reconciliation, ooding, and Erlay
in their bandwidth usage and latency to reach all nodes.
e transaction relay protocol must not be any more susceptible
to DoS aacks and client deanonymization, and must not leak any
more information about the network topology [46] than the existing
protocol.
5 ERLAY DESIGN
Traditionally, P2P networks addressed ineciency of ooding by
imposing a structured overlay onto an ad-hoc topology. We re-
frained from structured network organizations for security reasons
discussed in Section 4. Instead, our design relies on two common
system-building techniques: delay and batching.
Instead of announcing every transaction on each link, a node
using our protocol advertises it to a subset of peers—this is called
low-fanout ooding. To make sure that all transactions reach the
entire network, nodes periodically engage in an interactive protocol
to discover announcements that were missed, and request missing
transactions. is is called set reconciliation. Our protocol, Erlay, is
comprised of low-fanout ooding and set reconciliation (Fig. 5).
Low-fanout ooding. e rationale behind low-fanout ood-
ing is to expediently relay a transaction to be within a small number
of hops from every node in the network. If each transaction ends
up close to every node, then reconciliation can nish dissemina-
tion using a small number of rounds. erefore, a key decision in
low-fanout ooding is to which peers to relay.
Set reconciliation. Set reconciliation was proposed as an alter-
native to synchronization in distributed systems [42]. Using set
reconciliation a node in a P2P network periodically compares its
local state to the state of its peers, and sends/requests only the
necessary information (the state dierence). Set reconciliation may
be viewed as an ecient version of batching (accumulating multi-
ple state updates and sending them as a single message). e key
challenge in practical reconciliation is for the peers to eciently
compute their missing transaction state, and to limit the exchanged
transactions to just those that the other peer is missing.
Fig. 6 shows how Erlay aempts to nd a sweet spot in terms of
bandwidth and latency by combining ooding, which wastes band-
width but disseminates transactions quickly, and reconciliation,
which takes longer, but does not waste bandwidth.
5.1 Low-fanout ooding
Flooding is expensive, so we want to use it sparingly and in strategic
locations. For that reason, only well-connected public nodes ood
transactions to other public nodes via outbound connections. Since
every private node is directly connected to several public nodes,
this policy ensures that a transaction is quickly propagated to be
within one hop from the majority of the nodes in the network. As
a result, only one or two reconciliation rounds are needed for full
reachability (R3). According to this, the protocol we propose may
be viewed as two-tier optimistic replication [51].
To meet our scalability goal (R1), we limit the ooding done by
public nodes to eight outbound connections even if the total number
of these connections is higher. is way, increasing connectivity
does not increase transaction dissemination cost proportionally.
e decision to relay through outbound connections, but not the
inbound ones, was made to defend against timing aacks [17, 46].
In a timing aack, an aacker connects to a victim and listens to
all transactions that a victim might send on that link (the inbound
connection for the victim). If an aacker learns about a transaction
from multiple nodes (including the victim), the timing of transaction
arrival can be used to guess whether a transaction originated at the
victim: if it did then it will most likely arrive from the victim earlier
than from other nodes. BTCFlood introduces a diusion delay to
prevent timing aacks. In Erlay, since we do not forward individual
transactions to inbound links, this delay is not necessary. So this
decision favors both R3 and R4.
Transactions in the Bitcoin network may originate at both public
and private nodes. In the protocol we propose, nodes do not relay
their transactions via ooding, so the network learns about the
transactions they have originated via reconciliation: private nodes
add their own transactions to the batch of other transactions that
they forward to their peers during reconciliation. is is used to
hide when transactions are originated at private nodes. If transac-
tions were instead ooded from private nodes, it would be obvious
to public nodes that those transactions must have been created at
those nodes, because according to the chosen ooding policy, this
is the only case where a private node oods a transaction, as they
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have no inbound links. Since a private node forwards its own trans-
actions as part of a batch, as opposed to individually, a malicious
public node is unlikely to discover the origin of a transaction (R4).
5.2 Set reconciliation
In Erlay peers perform set reconciliation by computing a local set
sketch, as dened by the PinSketch algorithm [18]. A set sketch is
a type of set checksum with two important properties:
• Sketches have a predetermined capacity, and when the
number of elements in the set does not exceed the capacity,
it is always possible to recover the entire set from the
sketch by decoding the sketch. A sketch of b-bit elements
with capacity c can be stored in bc bits.
• A sketch of the symmetric dierence between the two
sets (i.e., all elements that occur in one but not both input
sets), can be obtained by XORing the bit representation of
sketches of those sets.
ese properties make sketches appropriate for a bandwidth-
ecient set reconciliation protocol. More specically, if two parties,
Alice and Bob, each have a set of elements, and they suspect that
these sets largely but not entirely overlap, they can use the following
protocol to have both parties learn all the elements of the two sets:
• Alice and Bob both locally compute sketches of their sets.
• Alice sends her sketch to Bob.
• Bob combines the two sketches, and obtains a sketch of
the symmetric dierence.
• Bob tries to recover the elements from the symmetric dif-
ference sketch.
• Bob sends to Alice the elements that she is missing.
is procedure will always succeed when the size of the dier-
ence (elements that Alice has but Bob does not have plus elements
that Bob has but Alice does not have) does not exceed the capacity
of the sketch that Alice sent. Otherwise, the procedure is very likely
to fail.
A key property of this process is that it works regardless of the
actual set sizes: only the size of the set dierences maers.
Decoding the sketch is computationally expensive and is qua-
dratic in the size of the dierence. Because of this, accurately
estimating the size of the dierence (Section 5.2.1) and reconcil-
ing before the set dierence becomes too large (Section 5.2.2) are
important goals for the protocol.
5.2.1 Reconciliation round. Fig. 7 summarizes the reconciliation
protocol. To execute a round of reconciliation, every node maintains
a reconciliation set for each one of its peers. A reconciliation set
consists of short IDs of transactions that a node would have sent to a
corresponding peer in regular BTCFlood, but has not because Erlay
limits ooding. We will refer to Alice’s reconciliation set for Bob
as A and Bob’s set for Alice as B. Alice and Bob will compute the
sketches for these reconciliation sets as described in the previous
section.
Important parameters of the protocol are: D – the true size of
the set dierence, d – an estimate of D, and q – a parameter used to
compute d . We provide the derivation of these values below. First,
we describe a reconciliation round:
(1) According to a chosen reconciliation schedule (Section 5.2.2),
Alice sends to Bob the size of A and q.
(2) Bob computesd , an estimate ofD, between hisB and Alice’s
A (see below).
(3) Bob computes a sketch of B with capacity for D transac-
tions and sends it to Alice, along with the size of B.
(4) Alice receives Bob’s sketch of B, computes a sketch of A,
and XORs the two sketches. Now Alice has a sketch of the
dierence between A and B.
(5) If the dierence size was estimated correctly, Alice is able
to decode the sketch computed in the previous step, request
the transactions that she is missing from Bob, and then
advertise to Bob the transactions that he is missing. If the
estimation was incorrect (sketch decoding failed), Alice
will resort to bisection (Section 5.2.3).
(6) Aer this process, Alice updates q (see below) and clears
A. Bob clears B.
Accurate estimation of D is crucial for success of reconciliation.
Prior work estimatedD using techniques like min-wise hashing [10]
or random projections [24]. ese techniques are complex, and we
were concerned that they could end up using more bandwidth
than they save. erefore, we resorted to a minimalistic approach,
where we estimate the size of the set dierence based on just the
current sizes of sets and the dierence observed in the previous
reconciliation round:
d = abs(|A| − |B |) + q ·min(|A|, |B |) + c,
where q is a oating point coecient (derived below) that charac-
terizes previous reconciliation, and c is a parameter for handling
special cases.
Indeed, the dierence between two sets cannot be smaller than
the dierence in their sizes. To avoid costly underestimations, we
add the size of the smaller set normalized by q, and a constant
c = 1, which prevents estimating d = 0 when |A| = |B | and q ·
min(|A|, |B |) = 0.
e coecient q characterizes earlier reconciliation, so before
the very rst reconciliation round it is set to zero. At the end of
a reconciliation round, we simply update q based on the true D
that we discovered during the round, by substituting D for d in the
above equation, dropping c , and then solving for q:
q =
D − abs(|A| − |B |)
min(|A|, |B |)
is updated q will be used in the next reconciliation round. We
compute q in this way because we assume that every node in the
network will have a consistent optimal q.
Reconciliation is a fertile ground for DoS aacks, because decod-
ing a sketch is computationally expensive. To prevent these aacks,
in our protocol the node that is interested in reconciliation (and the
one that has to decode the sketch) initiates reconciliation (Alice, in
our example). Bob cannot coerce Alice to perform excessive sketch
decoding.
5.2.2 Reconciliation schedule. Every node initiates reconcilia-
tion with one outbound peer every T seconds. Choosing the right
value for T is important for performance and bandwidth consump-
tion. If T is too low, reconciliation will run too oen and will use
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Figure 7: Reconciliation protocol with correct dierence estimation (Reconcile-Init, followed by DiExchange), and reconcil-
iation protocol with incorrect dierence estimation (Reconcile-Init, followed by Reconcile-Bisec). In case reconciliation fails
during Reconcile-Bisec, reconciliation falls back to Bitcoin’s current exchange method (see Fig. 3).
more bandwidth than it saves. If T is too high, reconciliation sets
will be large and decoding set dierences will be expensive (the
computation is quadratic in the number of dierences). A large T
also increases the latency of transaction propagation.
A node reconciles with one peer every T seconds. Since every
node has c outbound connections, every link in the network would,
on average, run reconciliation every T · c seconds. is means
that the average reconciliation set prior to reconciliation would
contain T · c · TX rate transactions, where TX rate is the global
transaction rate. is also means that during the interval between
reconciliations every node would receive T ·TX rate transactions.
We use a value of 1 second for T in Erlay. With this seing,
and the current ratio of private to public nodes, every public node
will perform about eight reconciliations per second. Given the
current maximum Bitcoin network transaction rate TX rate of 7
transactions/s, the average dierence set size for this protocol is 7
elements. We evaluate our choice of parameters in Section 8.
5.2.3 Bisection for set dierence estimation failure. Our set rec-
onciliation approach relies on the assumption that an upper bound
for the set dierence between two peers is predictable. at is, if the
actual dierence is higher than estimated, then reconciliation will
fail. is failure is detectable by a client computing the dierence.
An obvious solution to this failure is to recompute and retransmit
the sketch assuming a larger dierence in the sets. However, this
would make prior reconciliation transmissions useless, which is
inecient.
Instead, Erlay uses reconciliation bisection, which reuses previ-
ously transmied information. Bisection is based on the assumption
that elements are uniformly distributed in reconciliation sets (this
may be achieved by hashing). If a node is unable to reconstruct the
set dierence from a product of two sketches, the node then makes
an additional reconciliation request, similar to the initial one, but
this request is applied to only a fraction of possible messages (e.g.,
to transactions in the range 0x0–0x8). Because of the linearity of
sketches, a sketch of a subset of transactions would allow the node
to compute a sketch for the remainder, which saves bandwidth.
However, this approach would allow recovery of at most 2d
dierences, where d is the estimated set dierence in the initial step.
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S0 N
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Figure 8: Bisection is enabled by the linearity of sketches
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Figure 9: e decode time of our library (Minisketch) as com-
pared to CPISync for varying set dierence sizes.
Even though bisections are not limited to one and may be applied
consequentially without losing eciency, in our implementation
aer a reconciliation step failure we allow only one bisection with
a new overall estimate 2d (see Fig. 8). e bisection process is
illustrated in protocol Reconcile-Bisec in Figure 7.
If bisection fails, then Erlay falls back to the original INV-GETDATA
protocol (Fig. 3) and applies it to all of the transactions in two sets
being reconciled.
6 IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
In this section we describe low-level design decisions required to
implement Erlay and increase its bandwidth eciency (R2) and
make it robust to collision-based DoS aacks (R4).
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Library implementation. We created Minisketch2, a C++ library
with 3305 LOC, which is an optimized implementation of the PinS-
ketch [18] algorithm. We benchmarked the library to verify that
set reconciliation would not create high computational workload
on Bitcoin nodes. Fig. 9 shows the decoding performance on an
Intel Core i7-7820HQ CPU of our library (Minisketch) as compared
to CPISync [54]3 for varying dierence sizes. Our library has sub-
millisecond performance for dierence sizes of 100 elements or
fewer. As we will show later (Fig. 13) this performance is su-
ciently fast for the dierences we observe in practice (in simulation
and in deployment).
We used this library to build a reference implementation of
Erlay as a part of the Bitcoin Core soware, which we evaluate in
Section 9.
Short identiers and salting. e size of a transaction ID in the
Bitcoin protocol is 32 bytes. To use PinSketch [18], we have to use
shorter, 64 bit, identiers. Using fewer bits reduces the bandwidth
usage by 75% (R2), but it also creates a probability of collisions.
Collisions in transaction relay are an aack surface, because a
malicious actor may ood a network with colluding transactions
and ll memory pools of the nodes with transactions, which would
then be propagated and conrmed in a very slow manner. us we
want to secure the protocol against such aacks (R4).
While collisions on one side of a communication are easy to
detect and handle, collisions involving transactions on both sides
may cause a signicant slowdown. To mitigate this, we use dierent
salt (random data added to an input of a hash-function) while
hashing transaction IDs into short identiers.
e salt value is enforced by the peer that initiates the connection,
and per Erlay’s design, requests reconciliation. Since the peer re-
questing reconciliation also computes the reconciliation dierence,
the requestor peer would have to deal with short IDs of unknown
transactions. Since salt is chosen by the requestor, re-using the
same salt for dierent reconciliations would allow him to compare
salted short IDs of unknown transactions to the IDs received during
ooding from other peers at the same time.
Low-fanout diusion delay. Bitcoin ooding mitigates timing
aacks [46] and in-ight collisions by introducing a random de-
lay into transaction announcements. For timing aacks Bitcoin
assumes that an aacker connects (possibly, multiple times) to
the node (or takes over a fraction of outbound connections of the
node). In a low-fanout model, this aack is not feasible, because
transactions are ooded through outbound connections only.
In-ight collisions are also not possible in the case of low-fanout
relay through only outbound links, because transactions are always
announced in the same direction of a link.
In consideration of these arguments as well as to reduce latency,
Erlay has a lower random diusion interval. Instead of usingToi = 2
seconds for outbound connections andTii = 5 seconds for inbound,
Erlay uses Toi = 1 seconds for outbound.
Reconciliation diusion delay. Even though in Erlay timing at-
tacks by observing low-fanout ooding are not feasible, an aacker
would be able to perform them through reconciliations. To make
timing aacks through reconciliations more expensive to perform,
2hps://github.com/sipa/minisketch
3hps://github.com/trachten/cpisync
we enforce every peer to respond to reconciliation requests aer a
small random delay (in our implementation, a Poisson-distributed
random variable which is on average Tr i = 1 seconds), which is
shared across reconciliation requests from all peers, and we rate-
limit reconciliations per peer. is measure would make Erlay
beer than BTCFlood at withstanding timing aacks.
Our measure in Erlay has the same idea as in ooding/low-fanout
diusion; however, having the ratio Tii/Toi higher makes timing
aacks less accurate, because duringTii (the average time before an
aacker receives a transaction) a transaction would be propagated
to more nodes in the network.
We chose the interval of 1 seconds because a lower interval
would make Erlay more susceptible to timing aacks than Bitcoin,
and a higher interval results in a high latency.
7 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
In evaluating Erlay we focus on answering the following three
questions:
(1) How does Erlay compare to BTCFlood in latency (the time
that it takes for the transaction to reach all of the nodes)
and bandwidth (the number of bits used to disseminate a
transaction)?
(2) How do the two parts of Erlay (low-fanout ooding and
reconciliation) perform at scale and with varying connec-
tivity, varying number of nodes, and varying transaction
rates?
(3) How do malicious nodes impact Erlay’s performance?
We use measurement results from two sources to answer the
questions above. First, we used a simulator to simulate Erlay on a
single machine (Section 8). Second, we implemented Erlay in the
mainline Bitcoin client and deployed a network of Erlay clients on
the Azure cloud across several data centers (Section 9).
Simulator design. Our simulation was done with ns3. We mod-
ied an open-source Bitcoin Simulator [26] to support transaction
relay. e original simulator had 9663 LOC; the version we modied
has 9948 LOC.
Our simulator is based on the INV-GETDATA transaction relay
protocol (see Section 2). It is parameterized by the current ratio of
public nodes to private nodes in the Bitcoin network and the trans-
action rate based on the historical data from the Bitcoin network
(7 transactions per second on average). We simulate the dierent
ratios of faults in the network by introducing Black Hole nodes,
which receive transactions but do not relay them.
Our simulator does not account for heterogeneous node re-
sources, the block relay phase, the joining and leaving of nodes
during the transaction relay phase (churn), and does not consider
sophisticated malicious nodes.
e propagation latency measured for BTCFlood by our sim-
ulator matches the value suggested for the validation of Bitcoin
simulators [22], and our measured bandwidth matches our analyti-
cal estimates.
Topology of the simulated network. We emulated a network
similar to the current Bitcoin network, since inferring the Bitcoin
network topology is non-trivial [46]. In our simulation we boot-
strapped the network in two phases: (1) public nodes connected
to each other using a limit of eight outbound connections, then (2)
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Figure 10: Average bandwidth one Bitcoin node spends per
month to announce transactions.
private nodes connected to eight random public nodes. In some
experiments we increased connectivity, as indicated in the experi-
ment’s description.
Unless stated otherwise, our simulation results are for a network
of 6,000 public nodes and 54,000 private nodes (this is the scale of
today’s network4). In each experiment we rst used the above two
steps to create the topology, then we relayed transactions for 600
seconds (on average, we generated 4,200 transactions from random
private nodes).
8 SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section we use simulation to demonstrate latency, bandwidth
consumption, and security of Erlay and compare them to BTCFlood.
8.1 Relay bandwidth usage
To verify that Erlay scales beer than BTCFlood as the connectivity
increases, we varied the number of outbound connections per node
and measured the bandwidth used for announcing transactions.
Figure 10 shows the results.
With BTCFlood, relay bandwidth increases linearly with the
connectivity because BTCFlood announces transactions on every
link in the network. With Erlay, however, bandwidth consump-
tion grows signicantly slower. Erlay seamlessly embraces higher
connectivity, which allows for beer security.
Transaction announcements in overall bandwidth. To demon-
strate that Erlay’s announcement optimization impacts overall band-
width, we measure the bandwidth consumed by a simulated net-
work to relay transactions with BTCFlood and with Erlay. Fig. 11
plots the results for simulations in which every node establishes 8
connections. Erlay’s announcement bandwidth is just 12.8% of the
relay bandwidth, while for BTCFlood the announcement bandwidth
is 47.6%.
Breaking down Erlay’s bandwidth usage. To further under-
stand Erlay’s bandwidth usage, we broke it down by the dierent
parts of the protocol: low-fanout ooding, reconciliation, and post-
reconciliation announcements.
4hps://bitnodes.earn.com/
hps://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/les/charts/soware.html
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Figure 11: Average bandwidth cost of fully relaying trans-
actions during 1 month for a Bitcoin node with outbound
connectivity of 8.
Table 1: Breakdown of bandwidth usage in Erlay.
Erlay component Bandwidth %
Low-fanout ooding 54%
Reconciliation 32%
Bisection 0.7%
Fallback 4.3%
Post-reconcile. INVs 9%
Total 100%
Table 1 lists the results. e table shows that about a third of
the bandwidth is used by reconciliation, while low-fanout ooding
accounts for a majority of the bandwidth. e post-reconciliation
INVs account for a small fraction of Erlay’s bandwidth.
Set reconciliation eectiveness. To understand the eective-
ness of Erlay’s set reconciliation, we measured how oen recon-
ciliation or the following bisection protocol fail. Fig. 12 reports
the results aggregated from one of our simulation runs with 60,000
nodes. e end-to-end probability of reaching fallback is below 1%.
Since bisection does not introduce additional bandwidth overhead
(while fallback does), the overall reconciliation overhead is low.
Since every reconciliation round requires a set dierence esti-
mation, we measured the distribution of the estimated dierence
sizes. Fig. 13 demonstrates that set dierence depends on transac-
tion rate. is is expected: for the same reconciliation intervals,
a higher transaction rate would result in both reconciling parties
receiving more transactions and would lead to a larger set dier-
ence. is dependency between set dierence and transaction rate
allows accurate set dierence estimation. Fig. 12 illustrates that
Erlay’s estimate is correct 96% of the time. For the cases where
Erlay over-estimates and the initial reconciliation fails, the resulting
bandwidth overhead constitutes 9% of the overall bandwidth.
In our library benchmarks the decode time for a sketch con-
taining 100 dierences is under 1 millisecond (Fig. 9). us, the
computational cost of operating over sketches with the distribution
in Fig. 13 is negligible.
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Figure 13: Distribution of the set dierence estimates during
reconciliation for dierent transaction rates.
8.2 Relay latency
Fig. 14 plots the average latency for a single transaction to reach
all nodes for Erlay and BTCFlood as we vary the total number of
nodes. In this set of experiments we kept constant the ratio between
private and public types of nodes at 9 : 1 (this is the ratio in today’s
Bitcoin network). Erlay has a constant latency overhead on top of
BTCFlood that is due to its use of batching. However, this overhead
is just 2.6 seconds and changes at approximately the same rate with
the number of nodes as BTCFlood’s latency. Erlay’s per-transaction
latency can be reduced at the cost of higher bandwidth usage. is
is a tunable parameter, subject to design constraints.
We chose to pay this latency overhead, because this is accept-
able cost to maximize bandwidth eciency, as we demonstrate in
Section 10.
One of Erlay’s goals is to enable higher connectivity. We there-
fore analyzed the latency of Erlay and BTCFlood for dierent con-
nectivities of the network. Figure 15 demonstrates that, as the con-
nectivity increases, latency signicantly decreases for BTCFlood (at
high bandwidth cost), and only slightly decreases for Erlay without
signicant eect on bandwidth.
To understand how transactions propagate across the network,
we measured the latency to reach a certain fraction of nodes in
the network. Figure 16 demonstrates that Erlay follows the same
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Figure 14: Average latency for a single transaction to reach
100% nodes in networks with dierent sizes.
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Figure 16: Average latency for a single transaction to reach
a certain fraction of nodes in the network
propagation paern as BTCFlood with a fairly constant overhead
of 2.6 seconds.
Latency under faulty condition We also evaluated Erlay’s
latency in a simple adversarial seing. For this we simulated a
network in which 10% of the public nodes are black holes and
measured the time for a transaction to reach all nodes. While it is
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action rate
dicult to outperform the robustness of BTCFlood, an alternative
protocol should not be dramatically impacted by this aack.
According to our measurements, while the slowdown with BTCFlood
in this seing is 2%, the slowdown with Erlay is 20%. We believe
that this latency increase is acceptable for a batching-based proto-
col. We have ideas for heuristics that might be applied to mitigate
black-hole aacks and make Erlay less susceptible. For example,
a node might avoid reconciling with those outbound connections
that regularly provide the fewest new transactions.
8.3 Scalability with transaction rate
To demonstrate that bandwidth savings and latency are not im-
pacted by higher transaction rates, we simulated a network of
54,000 private and 6,000 public nodes with connectivity of 8, gen-
erated transactions at dierent rates (from 7 tx/s to 70 tx/s), and
measured the impact of higher transaction rates on latency and
bandwidth.
Figure 17 shows that the relative bandwidth savings of Erlay
is not impacted by transaction rate. Figure 18 shows that Erlay’s
latency remains constant for dierent transaction rates. We also
Private node spies BTCFlood Erlay
5% 18% 16%
10% 20% 20%
30% 20% 27%
60% 21% 31%
Table 2: Success rate of rst-spy estimator with variable
number of private spying nodes in BTCFlood and Erlay.
Public node spies BTCFlood Erlay
5% 11% 11%
10% 19% 15%
30% 52% 32%
60% 82% 67%
Table 3: Success rate of rst-spy estimator with variable
number of public spying nodes in BTCFlood and Erlay.
conrmed these results in a network of 100 nodes running our
prototype implementation.
8.4 Withstanding timing attacks
One of Erlay’s design goals is to be more robust to timing aacks
from sybils [17, 28].
To evaluate Erlay’s robustness against timing aacks, we sim-
ulated a network of 60,000 nodes and used rst-spy estimator ap-
proach to link transactions to nodes of their origin.
With the rst-spy estimator an aacker deploys some number of
spy nodes. Each node keeps a local log of timestamped records, each
of which records (1) when the spy rst learned about a transaction,
and (2) from which node the spy learned it. In our setup, at the end
of the experiment the spy nodes aggregate their logs and estimate
that the source node of a transaction is the node which was the
very rst one to announce the transaction (to any of the spies).
Tables 2 and 3 list the success rates of the rst-spy estimator
for dierent number of spies, which were either private or public
nodes.
While Erlay is more susceptible to spying by private nodes (Ta-
bles 2), we believe that this is acceptable for three reasons. (1) e
success rate is below 50% for both protocols, which means that this
deanonymization aack is unreliable, (2) the dierence between
the two protocols is at most 10%, and (3), Erlay is materially more
susceptible to spying when there are higher levels of private spying
nodes (30%). At this level, an aack with public spies is a more
reasonable alternative since the aacker must control fewer nodes
to achieve a higher aack success rate.
By contrast, Erlay increases the cost of the deanonymization
aack by public nodes (Table 3): an aacker must control more
long-running public nodes in the network with Erlay than with
BTCFlood to achieve the same aack rate.
We also measured that increasing the connectivity with Erlay
does not change success rate of rst-spy estimation.
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8.5 Reconciliation and ooding trade-o
Erlay’s design combines ooding with reconciliation to achieve a
balance between two extremes: the current ooding-only protocol
in Bitcoin (BTCFlood), and a reconciliation-only protocol. is
intuition is captured in the latency-bandwidth trade-o diagram in
Figure 6. However, does Erlay actually strike a balance? And, what
other intermediate protocol alternatives lie between ooding-only
and reconciliation-only designs?
A key design choice in Erlay is to ood transactions to 8 out-
bound peers and none to the inbound peers. We have also con-
sidered other alternatives while designing Erlay. Although a full
exposition of the design space is beyond the scope of this paper, we
present a limited comparison of the latency-bandwidth trade-o
for several other protocol variants that use a dierent choice of
ooding inbound/outbound peers. Specically, we used our simu-
lator to collect data about versions of the Erlay protocol that use
X inbound peers and Y outbound peers for ooding (while using
reconciliation on all links including X and Y ), for dierent values
of X and Y .
We ran several experiments, with each experiment being a proto-
col conguration that select a specic X inbound and Y outbound
values. In these experiments we simulated a network of 24,000
private and 6,000 public nodes and relayed a total of 1,000 transac-
tions5. We collected transaction latency and bandwidth usage for
each experiment and Figure 19 plots the results.
Figure 19 shows that BTCFlood and Reconciliation-only indeed
lie at opposite ends of the trade-o spectrum (top le for BTCFlood
and boom right for Reconciliation-only). And, most key, Erlay
lies closer to the boom le corner than either conguration. is
gure also shows that congurations with other choices of values
5We restricted the network size to constraint the experiment running time
BTCFlood Erlay
Base cost (MB)
(TX+GETDATA) 27 27
Other messages (MB) 1.06 1.1
Announcement cost (MB) 42 15
Latency (s) 1.85 2.05
Table 4: Prototype measurements collected from a 100-node
deployment comparing the latency and bandwidth of the
BTCFlood in the reference implementation against our Er-
lay implementation.
for X and Y get close to the le corner. But they do not strike as
good a balance between latency and bandwidth as Erlay does.
9 REFERENCE IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS
We implemented Erlay as part of Bitcoin Core. For this we added
584 LOC, not including Minisketch. We used a network of 100
Azure nodes located in 6 data centers, running a reference imple-
mentation of our protocol integrated in Bitcoin Core node soware,
to evaluate Erlay in deployment. We generated and relayed 1000
transactions, all originating from one node with a rate of 7 transac-
tions per second. We compared the average latency and bandwidth
of Erlay versus Bitcoin’s current implementation. Table 4 summa-
rizes our results. According to our measurements, Erlay introduced
a latency increase of 0.2 seconds, while saving 40% of the overall
node bandwidth.
As in our simulations, Erlay has a higher latency but lower
bandwidth cost, conrming our original design intent (Fig. 6).
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10 DISCUSSION
Reconciliation-only relay. We believe that a reconciliation-only
transaction relay protocol would be inherently susceptible to tim-
ing aacks that could reveal the source of the transaction. Unlike
ooding, reconciliation is inherently bi-directional: an inbound
connection for one peer is an outbound connection for another
peer. Delays cannot be applied per-direction but rather per-link.
erefore, BTCFlood’s diusion delay cannot be used in reconcilia-
tion.
Erlay increases latency from 3.15s to 5.75s Erlay increases
the time to relay an unconrmed transaction across all nodes, which
is a small fraction of the end-to-end transaction processing (10
minutes).
We tuned Erlay to maximize bandwidth savings assuming that an
increase in latency from 3.15s to 5.75s is acceptable. It is possible to
tune Erlay to provide the same latency as BTCFlood by reconciling
more oen, but this would save 70% of transaction relay bandwidth
instead of 84%. If we tuned Erlay to provide the same latency as
BTCFlood, we could increase network connectivity and improve
the network security without additional bandwidth overhead.
In practice, there are 2 primary implications of transaction relay
latency increase.
Block production rate is dened by block relay latency, which
is only indirectly dened by transaction relay latency: if fewer
transactions are relayed, it will take longer for blocks to propagate
(since missing transactions have to be relayed and validated). Block
production rate is dened in this way because to maximize the
security of the network all miners have to work on the latest block
and can avoid generating “orphan” blocks. Because Erlay’s latency
among public nodes is beer than BTCFlood (Erlay’s diusion
interval is lower), miners’ orphan rate will probably be lower with
Erlay. And, because most miners today use an overlay network
(e.g., FIBRE), transaction relay latency increase (3.15s to 5.75s with
Erlay will have even less impact.
User experience. If a transaction is accepted in an unconrmed
state, then the user perceives the 2.6s latency increase. However,
unconrmed transactions are rarely accepted by users. Instead,
users wait for at least 10 minutes to conrm transactions. erefore,
we think that Erlay’s 2.6s latency increase insignicantly impacts
the users’ experience.
Compatibility with Dandelion. Dandelion is an alternative
transaction relay protocol introduced to improve the anonymity
and robustness to adversarial observers in Bitcoin [23]. Dandelion
has two phases: stem (propagation across a single link of ten nodes
on average), and u (relay using ooding from the last node in
the stem link). Erlay is complimentary with Dandelion: Erlay
would replace the u phase in Dandelion, while the stem phase of
Dandelion would ood through both inbound and outbound links
to preserve the privacy of private nodes.
Backward compatibility. Only about 30% of Bitcoin nodes
run the latest release of Bitcoin Core6. erefore, Erlay must be
backwards compatible. If not all nodes use Erlay, then Erlay may
be activated per-link if both peers support it.
Sophisticated timing attacks. In Section 8.4 we demonstrated
that Erlay is less susceptible to timing aacks based on the rst-spy
6hps://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/les/charts/security.html
estimator. Withstanding more sophisticated aacks (e.g., nger-
printing propagation traces) is an open question for future research.
Mining-related attacks. ere is no direct relationship be-
tween Erlay and aacks like selsh mining [21]. By making timing
aacks more expensive, Erlay makes it harder to infer the network
topology. Inferring the topology would allow clustering the net-
work by aacking bolenecks. Clustering the network would then
split mining eorts and introduce many orphan blocks until the net-
work clusters recompose. us, Erlay indirectly makes the network
stronger.
Relevance to other blockchains. Erlay is relevant to most
other deployed blockchains (e.g., Ethereum, Zcash) because they
use ooding for transaction relay. Even though there might be a
dierence in TXID size or number of connected peers, the dierence
that maers is transaction rate. As Figures 17 and 18 illustrate, Erlay
is theoretically suitable for systems with higher transaction rate.
On the other hand, since PinSketch has quadratic complexity, us-
ing it without modications would lead to the high computational
cost of reconciliation, and higher hardware requirements. To re-
duce the computational cost of reconciliation, we suggest applying
bisection from the rst reconciliation step.
For example, consider a system with a network similar to Bitcoin,
but with a throughput of 700 transactions/s. If Erlay is applied in
the same way as we suggest for Bitcoin, an average reconciliation
set dierence would consist of 1,000 elements. According to the
benchmarks, straightforward reconciliation through Minisketch
would take 1,000 ms. At the same time, with bisection recursively
applied 3 times, 8 chunks consisting of 125 elements would have to
be reconciled, and this would take only 20 ms. is result makes
Erlay usable for systems with much higher transaction rate.
We do not propose this measure for Bitcoin, because consid-
ering the transaction rate in Bitcoin, the computational cost of
reconciliation is already low enough.
11 RELATEDWORK
Prior studies of Bitcoin’s transaction relay focused on information
leakage and other vulnerabilities [23, 46], and did not consider
bandwidth optimization. We believe that our work is the rst to
introduce a bandwidth-ecient, low-latency, and robust transaction
relay alternative for Bitcoin. Erlay is designed as a minimal change
to Bitcoin (584 LOC), in contrast with other proposals that optimize
Bitcoin more deeply [20].
Short transaction identiers. One solution to BTCFlood’s inef-
ciency is to use short transaction identiers. ere are two issues
with this solution. First, this only reduces bandwidth cost by a con-
stant factor. In our simulation we found that short identiers would
reduce redundant trac from 43% to 10%. But, with higher con-
nectivity, redundancy climbs back up faster than it does with Erlay.
e second issue with short IDs is that they would make the system
vulnerable to collision-related aacks, requiring a new per-node or
per-link secure salting strategy.
Blocksonly setting. Bitcoin Core 0.12 introduced a blocksonly
seing in which a node does not send or receive individual transac-
tions; instead, the node only handles complete blocks. As a result,
blocksonly has no INV message overhead. In the blocksonly case,
nodes will have to relay and receive many transactions at once.
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is will increase the maximum node bandwidth requirements and
cause spikes in block content relay and transaction validation.
Reconciliation alternatives. Prior work has also devised multi-
party set reconciliation [9, 43]. is approach, however, has addi-
tional complexity and additional trust requirements between peers.
We believe that the benets of such an approach are not substantial
enough to justify these limitations.
In addition, reconciliation-based techniques usually provide
bandwidth-eciency under the assumptions where most of the
state being reconciled is shared [12, 48].
Network attacks on Bitcoin and connectivity. e security
of the Bitcoin network has been under substantial scrutiny with
many published network-related aacks [6–8, 13, 16, 19, 27, 29,
32, 33, 36, 39, 40, 45]. ese aacks aempt to make the network
weaker (e.g., increase the probability of double-spending or denials
of service) or violate user privacy. Many of these aacks rely on
non-mining nodes and assume limited connectivity from victim
nodes. Our work allows Bitcoin nodes to have higher connectivity,
which we believe will make the network more secure.
Prior P2P research. Structured P2P networks are usually based on
Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs), in which every peer is responsible
for specic content [38]. In these networks research has explored
the use of topology information to make ecient routing deci-
sions [11, 50, 52, 55]. is design, however, makes these protocols
leak information about the structure of the network and makes
them less robust to Byzantine faults, though limited solutions to
Byzantine faults in this seing have been explored [14, 25].
e trade-o between latency and bandwidth eciency is well-
known in P2P research. Kumar et. al. identied and formalized
the trade-o between latency and bandwidth [34], and Jiang et. al.
proposed a solution to achieve an optimal combination of these
properties [30]. However, the solution was not designed for adver-
sarial seings.
Prior work also proposed feedback-based approaches to ood-
ing [3, 49]. However, we believe that to work eciently (have a
horizon larger than 1), this work would have unacceptable informa-
tion leakage.
12 CONCLUSIONS
Bitcoin is one of the most widely used P2P applications. Today,
Bitcoin relies on ooding to relay transactions in a network of
about 60,000 nodes. Flooding provides low latency and is robust
to adversarial behavior, but it is also bandwidth-inecient and
creates a signicant amount of redundant trac. We proposed
Erlay, an alternative protocol that combines limited ooding with
intermient reconciliation. We evaluated Erlay in simulation and
with a practical deployment. Compared to Bitcoin’s current proto-
cols, Erlay reduces the bandwidth used to announce transactions
by 84% while increasing the latency for transaction dissemination
by 2.6s (from 3.15s to 5.75s). Erlay allows Bitcoin nodes to have
higher connectivity, which will make the network more secure. We
are actively working to introduce Erlay into Bitcoin Core’s node
soware.
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